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. .THE INTRODUCTION OF coco~ IN THE GOLD COAST: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS
BE'IWEEN AFRIC/1.N FAmIERS AtD COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS

By
R. H. Green
~·,
S. H. Hymer
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"The resource in shortest supply, in most backward but developing countries, is
officials who c.:n argee ordinary people into forsaking tradition a11.<l risking new
ways."
ENKE, ]:co~rnmics for DeveloE,
mcnt, p. 125.

"Agticultur-e as a m::i<le:..-:1 science developed in the Temperate Zone ••• from our
__experiences_.· •• with the_ (relatively simple) agricultural problems_ of Europe and
North ./'JDerica. When the average scientific agricul!:uralis t goes to the tropics,
he has more to unlearn than to teach; but he frequently seems to be unaware of
that fact. 11
Edgar Anderson, Plants,
Men and Life

"When they (agricultural officers) talk, they seem to be young men of good sense
but nothing they tell us to do works out well."
African farmer's com11:ent
quoted in Melville
Herskovitz. 'Ihe Hmnan
Factor in Cb§lg:l.ng Africa
(i taHcs added)

I.
11

The peasant" is consistently d.ted as an obstacle to economic development

in Africa.

It is argued that he is unwilling to alter traditional methods and

institutions and unable to take advantage of opportunities for increasing pro
duce.i.vity.

In Professor E. S. Mason's view, the central question to be answered

in rural Africa is ''how can· a group of° tribally organized and seJ.f-sufficient.
peas

an ts,

sowing and reaping in accorde.nce with a8e old traditions and possess

ing limited and easily satisfied wa.its, become a collection of risk-taking indi
viduals, responsive to price Md income incentives, and interes tec1 in conserv::l.ng

.,

'

3

.

their land and improving their productivity?"

1

Ag.-:·:!.ns t this view are the numerous instances wLere African farm2rs have
rapidly accepted new crops and new techniques demonstrating a hieh propensity
to innovete, accept risk and invest well in advc1I1ce of returns.

On the surface

at least these seem entirely incompatible with the case of stagnant inertia - - ------

implied in the quotation by Mason and m~de so often and so forcefully by colonial
officers, World 13ank Nissions, ··foreign agricu1turalis ts and even many African
intellectuals.

2

The most notable examples are the radical increases in the pro-

duction of cash crops for export that have taken place in th~s century. For
example, between 1919 and 1959, e:i-.1>orts of Ghana (Gold Coast) rose 838%, those

of Nigeria 955%, and those of· (fonner) 'French West Africa 1,031% 3 to cite three
cases of African grown agricultural products all of which involved radical
shifts in crop pattern and the learning of new techniques of cultivat5.on and new
timing of plcmting and harvesting.

One ca!l also cite the earlier important and

sometimes drastic changes of output patterns of domestic food supplies involved
in the rapid and widespread dif~usion of maize, miliet, rice and citrus brought

.

to Africa from South Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

4

Equally noteworthy, there

1

Preface to Hontague Yudelman Africans on th2 Land, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1964.

2 cf., ~._g_.,S. Ngcobo's review of Yudelnc.:1, on. cit., Journal of Modern
African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4.

3P. L amart i'·ne Yates, Forty Years o £ 'Fore;i.;,p,n Trade, A11 en an d Um-an,
'
Lon d on,
1958, p. 238. cf. also H. Hartyi tz "Subsaharan Africa-As A Growing Economic.
System" in Herskovitz and Harwitz, .Q.E.• cit.
4 cf. Sylvia Harrop, "The Economy of the Hes t African Coast in the Sixteen th
Century, 11 Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 196l,, 113; P.A. Talbot, The Peooles of
Southern ?lir.eria, Oxford University Press, 1962, Vol. I, Passim. H. O. Jones,
. 11 Hnnioc: A."1 Example of Innovation in African Economies," Economic Develotirr.ent and
Cultural Ch!lnr,e V (.January, 1957), 99. TlH: growth of production· for African urban
markets h.ns also been substa:1tial and--at least since 1945--very rapid but less
evidence for a.,alysis is available. However, for d?ta on large scale dor.:cstic' food
farrns in Ghana, cf. Frank F. Bray, Yam Fa:rm~g_g in tforth Hc}.f!POng-Ashanti, Dcp'1rt
ment of Agriculture, University College of Ghana, Legon, 1958.

4
is substantial evidence that African food farmers have been willing and able
to meet growing urban food demands without sharp increases in the price of do

mestic food relative to other products. Such bottlenecks as have developed are
-- ·far more often related to transport and marketing deficiencies than to producer
failure to respond to economic incentives.
On the other hand, the fact remains that African response to the proposals

of agricultural experts and extension workers has, in the majority of instances,
been typified by indifference, rejection, and even open hostility.

This pattern

is not limited to the widely knm•m mechmized farming debacles such as the Tangan_. yika Groundnut Schen:e or to cases in which poJitical oppression and European land
control are linked to the Agricultural .service in a way that distorts both poli
cies and African responses, e.g. the Southern Rhodesian Land Husbandry Act. Even
in West African territories in which European settlers were few and promotion of
African agricultural production, the specific goal, the wo,rk of the agricul
tural departrnen t has had little impact on farming practice,· and· annual reports
regularly condeIIill the stubborn, stupid i'peasants, 11 who resist the advice offered

them.
In this essay, we wish to examine the introduction of cocoa into Ghana for
the Hgli:t it sheds on this apparent paradox. Side by side ,li th the rapid growth
of cocoa production since 1900, we find continuous and vociferous complain ts on
the part of the Gold Coast Agricultural Department about.the inefficiencies of
peasant cocoa: produc.ticm.

The explanation in this case seerns to be that the

Agricultural Department was offering wrong advice. The rejection by farmers was
a proof of their good sense rather than conservatism.

5

The findings are of more than local or purely historical interest in that
the attitudes and approaches and mistakes of the Gold Coast Colonial Agricul
tural Department appear to be common to colonial •:peasant" agricultural policy

·in general and to a considerable extent have persisted in independent A£rican
.
.
1
state agricultural outlook and programming.
Four propositions can be demonstrated in the context of Colonial Agricul
tural -Q:fficer--African farn:er relations in the Gold Coast Cocoa industry between

1890 and 19 40:

1.

The government made no systematic attempt to collect and analyze basic
statistical data; and official assessments of the cocoa industry's
structure and propsects were grossly inaccurate;

2.

The Agriculture Department's proposed techniques of production and
disease control were, by and large, inferior to those developed by
African farmers;

3.

Technical efficiency was consistently confused with economic effic
iency.

The Agriculture Department ignored economic incentives or even

viewed them as undesirable; their criticisms of African farmers very
often boiled down to charging them with maximixing net income.

1

See J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice,-· (Cambridge Universi.t.1-;,~
Press, 1948, pp. 323-334) for a discussi-on of parallel policies in Nalaya con
centrating on transferring •:peasant" production from the more profitiable rubber
to the less profitable rice. Furnivall' s material also shows the significantly
greater and more effective attention paid to European plantation agriculture as
opposed to local farmer production as does Bauer's in The Rubber Industry, £E_.cit.
We might also note tw:o other studies in Africa showing that the fan:.ers pat
tern of acceptance or rejection is based not on conservatism but on good judg~ent.
· A detailed study of Ugandan farn:ers by D.G. Belshaw and T. OtM.eno illus. trates that Agricultural Service proposals were often rejected because either the
technical conditions for applying them or the working capital for ~eeting the ex
tra cash production costs they involved were simply not present. "Technical Inno
vation in Two Systems of Peasant Agriculture in Bukedi District", East African ·
Institute of Social Research, Conference Papers, 1965, Ka.-r,pala, 1965.
[Footnote continued on page 6]

6
The Ghanaian "peasant" f arrr:ers, like his coen terpa.:-t in other parts of the world,
was able end 2.n:i-:ious to teke. advantage of economic opportunities and make cer
tain technical and institutional changes rec>.-:lily; though he was not able to
generate a continuous c!dvancc in technology o~ output per capita. 1

4~:.:

!.:..

II. A History of ..rlisccnceptions
The success of tl::'2. Ghana cocoa indus t:::y is illustrated in Figure 1. Exports expand2d at

a

rnte of about

% per annum in the first quarter of this

century changing G~2.nn froJ an insignificant supplier of cocoa at the beginning

of the century to the world's leading exporter by 1920 2 (about 40% of total
supply), a positim t:!.aintdned ever since (the share fell somewhat in the late

(footnote contin~~d frofil page 5]
And a detailed study
of response to ag1·icultu:-aJ. pr:::ipos~ls in a Tan?.a'.1.i<'.n district shows a clear pat..:.
tern of accepta:-ice for those propo:i:ils (end only thos8 proposals) which were seen
to offer subs tan ti.:::.l short or necliurn nm benefj_ ts. It also shows a very different
set of reactions to attei::pts to explai,1 propos-:1ls from attempts to enforce change
without demmstrating its v2lu2. J. Kesby, "Warang::. R~actiion to Agricultural Chan-ge
East Africc:'.1 Ins ti tu::e of Social R.:?search, Co:i.ference Papers. 1965, ..QE_. ci.t.

1 see Hla Hyin t Tl::e Economics of thcjJ~;fdJ.opin g Countries, Hutchinson, London,
1964, esp. c;1.
2 1n Changes ~n the Structure of th~ Economy of Gh&~a 1891-1911, London, 1965,
R. Sz0re~~-sl~Ueco:u::Lrat~s iP- detail foe total transformation or the Ghanaian
econo:nic structu~e :::.n this period lnrgely through Ch,maian investment in cocoa
and distinctly scco:,<l.:irily throu[;h Euror,~an private investment . in gold miqtng and
public invest~e~;t in public works. He further shows that gro~th to 1960 con
tinued within the cccnomic pattern created by the introduction of cocoa during
the 1891-1911 period.

7

Figure 1:

Cocoa Production of Ghana, Other African Smallholders,
Plantation Economies. World Production

Similar success has been registered by other countries where production is
largely in the hands of African smallholders, (Nigeria, and since the mid-1930 's
the Ivory Coast and Cameroon Republic) while the plantation economies of Latin
lunerica, West Indies, and African islands (e.g. Fernando Po, St. Thome) have
experienced a relative decline, and in a majority of cases absolute stagnation
as well.
The rapid growth of the industry was paralleled by a history of erroneous
description by official bodies despite its major significance to the economy of
Ghana, the views expressed on the cocoa industry have consistently been badly
informed and highly inaccurate.

Prior to the Second World Har, almost no atten

tion at all was paid to the collection of basic data on acreage, investment
yields, age distribution of trees, size of farms, and institutional patterns--

8

and knowledge on this subject remains uneven and inadequate even in 1965. 1
The errors date from the very beginning. For example, at first, credit for
the introduction of cocoa was given to the government (and occasionally to

missionaries).
11

In 1903--when exports were 2,280 tons--the Colonial Report asserted

the introduction i)f cocoa has been one of-the most successful of government

experiments

.,2

Even a decade later the Encyclopedia Brittanica which may be

taken as an index of informed British opinion states of Gold Coast cocoa:

3

The industry has been founded in 1879 by a native
of Accra, but it was not until 1901, ·as the result
of governrrent's fostering care that this export
became of significance. (Italics added)
This view was fairly widely held in official circles at the time--partly
because the government had provided cocoa beans from its Aburi Gardens (though
in fact the amount was minimal in relation to total planting) but mainly because
it was felt that African farmer initiative could not possibly have carried Ghana
1 For example, Ghana cocoa ecreage estimates--a byproduct of swollen
shoot disease control surveys--give an average yield per mature acre of 250
pounds. However,' sample data and agricultural service micro estimates range
from 400 to 800 pounds per acre. In short either almost all the micro cost
return studies or the acreage estimate (or both) must be highly unreliable.
Nonetheless, the current Ghana Agric'Jltural Census will not cover cocoa be
cause the official view is that existing data on acreage, yields per acre
(average and range) and age distribution is adequate. ·
2 colonial Report 1903, Gold Coast Government, Accra. The same report esti
mates acreage at 44,000 which is too low by a multiple of between five and ten.
1911 exports were 39,700 tons implying at least 200,000 acreas in full bearing
t8 years old and over), assuming 400 lbs. per acre and nearly 400,000 if
official 200 lo. per beari~g acre estimates were correct. This is a dramatic
illustration of how little was knot.;n
•
.3

.

11th Edition, London, 1914. p. 204.

..

9
to the position of the world's leading producer in the ~l years between 1890

and 1911.

It persisted as late as 1916 when the Curator of Kew Gardens,

writing to a 1916-1917 official inquiry into cocoa, asserted:

1

the rapid developrr.en t which has taken place has
been mainly due to the success which attended
the e-fforts of the officers of the Agifcultural. Department to establish and promote the industry
of cocoa grouing.

'lhe historical data, though admittedly sketchy, throw a rather different
light.

2

·

The crucial innovations were made in the 1880 1 s by Ghanaians,

3

and they

succeeded in spite of, not because of the department's efforts.
The present "official version" though clearly oversimplified, comesclose
to the truth.

This view attributes the effective

infrbcluction of cocoa in the

Gold Coast to Tetteh Quarshie, who, retun1ing from a contract on Fernando Po,
brought cocoa beans with which he established a seed farm, is clearly oversimpli
fied. 4

It perhaps placed too much emphasis on one man but it ;enects accurately

the fact that Gold Coast workers, mainly Artisans _and craftsmen--employed in
1 A. W. Hill, letter to Under Secretary of State, September 10, 1915,
cited in Gold Coast Sessional Paper II, 1916-1917, Accra, 1916, p. 62. As
this letter was placed in evidence by the Agriculture Departtr.ent it indicates
approval of this point of view.
2
.
.For a fu11er account _ see_.Polly Hill, Nigi-ant Cocoa Farmers of Southern
Ghana, Ca~bridge University Press, 1964, especially pp. 161-178 from which
much of the data in tne following paragraphs is drawn.
3 r.t is tr~e that the Basel Hiss ion had. begun efforts to introduce cash
crops for its Christian villages by 18!,3 wfrh cocoa included at least as ea~ly
as 1857 • but in the next two decades its efforts appear to have had only
minimal success.
4

Cf. West African Lands Committee, Draft Report, His Najesty 's Stationary
Office, Africa (west), No. 1,046,_ London, 1917, p. 96.

10

Nigeria, the Cameroons, the Gulf Islands (Fernando Po, St. Thome Principe) and
the Congo Free State· did play a criticab-trole in the establishment of cocoa.
In the Islands and the Cameroons they came in contact with cocoa cultivation and-
presumably---\·Je:ce impressed both by the incmnes cocoa earned for planters and the
____technical_similarity bet~teen ~pcoa farming and the oil palm plantations already
fairly widely established by the Krobo and Ak1<1apim farmers.
farms were established by these returning migrants.

1

Many of the first

These in turn demonstrated

the viability of cocoa planting to broader groups.
Beginning in the 1890's (judging from subsequent CXROrt figures) cocoa
2

planting spread very rapidly.

Akwapim farme.rs initially raised crops for seed

and sold the beans for establi!:,hing new farms as far afield as Southern Ashanti
by 1900.

3

The Basel Mission continued to raise and distribute some seeds and

4
. f ormat1on
.
·
·
·
h e 1 pe d sprea d 1n
on t h e- new crop i n t h e ·c·h. r1st1an
community.

The govern-

ment, however, at least until the middle 1890 1 s saw 9offee--not cocoa--as the

1 cf. Hill, .2E.· ci~., loc. cit., for fuller details on the establishment
of palm oil farms and the begin~ing of the land purchase and migrant company
systems later used by cocoa migrants. Cf. the Report on the Population Census,
1891, Government Printer, Accra, p. 24, for a discussion of the outflow of
skilled craftsmen.
2

Cocoa exports reached 5,000 tons in 1904 indicating that at least 25,000
and perhaps 50,000 acres had been planted by 1896.
3 oral reports collected by Ivor Wilks of the Institute of African Studies,
University of Ghana cited by Polly Hill, ££· cit., p. 16 7.
4 The per cent of Christians among early farmers· appears to have been sub·stantially above that for the .f.kwapim as a whole. 'Ihe direction of causation
is not clear, however, in that Christianity was related to desire for access
to education, health, and other European ~~enities so that the Christian commun
ity was probably both more eager to advance economically and more willing to
seek out new activities than the majority of the population.

11 ..

promising tree crop.

1

In late 1891 (when several thousand acres of cocoa had

already been pla.-rited) it reported that there was no appreciable demand for its
cocoa pods or plants.

2

On the basis of data on distributions it appears that

not more than 250 acres of a total exceeding 200 ~000--could have been planted

from this source by 1903.

Even in __ the h:i.gh years of 1910 and_1916, government~ ___

plants and pods sold to farmers were adequate for planting perhaps 60 and 75 acres

.
. 1 3
respective y.
One foreign gr~up had played an important facilitating role--the mercantile
houses. Their provision of a market--and later of any upcountry buying system
and crop advances--was essential to the industry.

Their organizational struc

ture, inte";z:est in promoting larger West African farn:.er exports to expand their
markets for European goods and contracts with British cocoa purchases

4

were a

1 various dispatches of Governor

Bradford Griffith (1888-1892), Report
of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast, ( 1889) cited by
Hill, pp. 173-176.
2 Dispatch dated November 9 ,- 1891, ADM 1/492 cited .21?..· cit., p. 176.
3

.
Estimated from Gold Coast Departraent of Agriculture Reports and Gold
Coast Colonj_al Reports, cf. also H.H. ·:ne'ckett, Koransc1ng: A Gold Coast, Govern
ment PrintelZ_, Accra, 1945, Introduction. In a letter Beckett gives the
1900..;..1920 distribution of seedling as "hundreds of thousands", in that 7501,000 seedlings are needed to plant an acre this would suggest that by 1920
not more than 10-15,000 acres of at least 1,000,000--could have been planted
from govenm.ent stock, The recurrent citation of seedling and seed totals-
in themselves impressive--with no indication of their relatfvely minor share
in total planting in itself C§lSts doubt on Agriculture Department knowledge of
the industry.

4

.
For a more detailed -description of this factor see W.K. Hancock "West •
Africa: The Traders I Frontier" in Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol.
II, Part II~ Oxford, 1940.
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necessary link _between. the African f3:rmers and the world coco·a market which was
entering a period of rapid expansion apparently linked to th'e late 19th and early
20th Century rise in reel wages of urban workers1.·

2 .
.
·By 1919 the domim:nt roJe of Africo.n farmers was finally recognized; but
followed by mother erroJ;, ne.l!lely that it must: require neither energy _nor

fore- ____ _

si_ght, sn a'.}sertio;:i cnintained for the next four decades despite the fairly ob
vious labour involved in clearing forest and the time horizon implicit in. plant
ing a tree crop wi~h an eight year period before substantial harvests. Even C.

.

Y. Sheperd in his nuthoritative Report on the Economics of Peasant Agriculture

3

b2gen "~he es tcblishment of a cocoa farm in the Gold Coast is a simple process. 11
The stan<lard picture came to be one of_ a sedentary peasant who burnt an acre or
.two of le1d ne~.-:: his village then ·grew maize on it until the fertility was ex
hausted.

Meanwhile, he dropped a few cocoa beans in the soil and passi\rely

waited for then to come into bearing.

Having established his farm he would spend

1 The same phc~ot:!.enon has been studied in greater detail in relation to
simi1m.·. switch of tea fron1 a limited market luxury good to a mass consumption
item two dcc2de!l earlier cf. S. Rajaratnam "The Ceylon Tea Industry, 1886-1931''
·ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies,· July-December, 1961.
2

For exa~ple, the tuelfth edition of the Encylopedia Brittanica in revision of its previous description stated:

The cocoa ind us try has throughout been en
tirely a native en-te:rprise, ·Europeans acting
only as carriers, purchasers and shippers.
London, 1919, P• 296. The.article was writfen by Sir Hugh Clifford, a former
Gold Coest Governor who had opposed th~ Departrr.ent of Agriculture's proposal~
·for lirr.itins industry expension' and enforcing changes in planting methods,
described belo~v.

3Gold Coc~.st Govc rnu:en t, Accra, 1936 •

13
a few days a year harvestii1g.

His income was supposedly spent--often in advance-

on, fu11eral feasts, litigation, and clothing and certainly not on new cocoa

farms.

1

The persistence of this-picture into the 1940 1 s and 1950 1 s is in itself a
devastating comn:ent on the Agr±·culture Department. So fa_!s_E: ___i_s it that one car1____

only conclude that the Department had made no serious attempt to study any as
pect of the actual operation of the industry it sought to advise and improve
even when it had the raw data in hand.
One reason it persisted is that the best known study of a cocoa-growing
2

community, W.ll. Beckett's Akokoaso , tended to reinforce certain features of
this view, ( though the author himself was not an upholder of the
_vident peasant" position).
per farmer.

lazy, impro

Altokoaso was typified by small farms and few farms

Planting had been done by the original villagers.

were near their horr,es.

11

Most farms

But this was not an accurate picture of the more im

portant segments of the ~ndustry.

On the contrary, cocoa planting required

considerable _entrepreneurial activities and broad horizons.

Polly Hill's

1

Cf. e.g., Shepherd, .£.E.· cit., W.S.D. Tudhope (Acting Director, Department of Agriculture) Enquiry into the Gold Coast Cocoa Industry. Interim and
Final Report, Gold Coast Sessional Papers, II and IV of 1918-19, Accra; Cocoa,
O.E.E.C. Paris, 1956, p. 20; Cocoa, FA0, Rome, 1955, pp. 16-21.
2

Akokoaso: A Survey of a Gold Coast Village, London School of Economics,
Nonographs on Social A.'lthropology, /Jl0, 1%4.

.

Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghann
production

1

provides exhaustive evidence that cocoa

in the Eastern Province, the major region of cocoa production in

the early years. was dominated by large· scale, migrant farmers who bought land
ahead of needs and ploughed a high share of their earnings in to new land--up to

--300 miles from their towns--and continually planted new cocoa~ 2 -The major post
World War II cocoa expansion into Hestern Ashanti shows a similar pattern of mi
-gration and capitalistic -enterprise--with Ashanti the dominant t::1igrant group
here as the Akwapim and Krobo had been in the East.

3

The evidence of the growth of the industry as contrasted to official atti-

tudes demonstrates two points. First, the short-run answer to the perennial Agri
culture Department ·doubts "expressed in a 1930 conference called to find out if

a country run by peasant farmers was economically sound" was clearly that the
industry could and did grow. Second, the Agriculture Departri-:ent did not carry

1
~- cit.
2 1n fact, Beckett·'--s second major study, Koransang: A Gold Coast Cocoa Farm,
Government Printer, Accra, 1945, does analyze a large migrant farm. However,
Akokoaso not Korans ang continued to be the 11 official arch type" of cocoa farming.
3 Personal communication from and discus~ion with Polly Hill, also F .R.
Bray, Cocoa Developrr.ent in ~.hafo, West Ashanti, Faculty _of Agriculture, Univer
sity College of Ghana, 1959. Expansion in the Wes tern and Central regions ha.s
also involved substantial migration by Eastern farmers, again a continuation of
1920's patterns made possible in this case by capsid control. Further confirma
tion of the effort and initiative required in cocoa production is found in an
unpublished survey by J. H. Nensah and the comprehensive study· for Wes tern Ni
geria. O. Dina., R, Galletti and K. Baldwin, Nigerian Cocoa Farrr.ers, Oxford
,1956.
•

"'
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out adequate investigation, nor for that matter did it even make use of the best
existing data on acreage, yield, farm and farmer size, income and investment
patterns, suitable land for new planting during the fifty years from Hl90 to
1940 1 •

In 1954 their errors were "authoritatively endorsed" by the Food and

Agricultural Organization which, basing its study on colonial reports, produced

a summary of the West African ind us try rehearsing the lazy non-economically
motivated, small scale peasant case.

2

However, lack of knowledge did not hinder the Agriculture Deparrrent

·in

makine numerous proposals regarding techniques of production, quality control,
optimum rate of industry expansion, rural credit, marketing organization, and
disease c;:_pntrol. . In general_ these proposals met with a near total lack of pro
ducer response. It could be argued that the adoption of some or all of the
policies endorsed by the Department would have -increased the success of the cocot:
industry. lespite their lack of knowledge, they might have been right.

In fact,

1 Post-war data, as noted above, is still incorilplete and misleading. More
over, some of the materials ~ere so hard to locate in the Agriculture Depart
ment itself in 1961 as to raise doubts as to what use, if any, was being made
of them.

2

.
Cocoa: A Review of Current Trends. 1955, ..QE_, c:l.t. F.A.O's manner of
providing 11expert advice" on cocoa deserves mention. The organization has
never conducted field research on the production side of the industry, Rather
it has sent queries to Agriculture Departments, These have usually been filled
in at the central office on the basis of prevailing guesses or impressions.
These are then printed as an "authoritative" study which is cited:: by the
same Agriculture Departrr.ents in support of their opinions. FAO has recently
become aware of the weakness of this process--perhaps becaus~ the early post
.w~r reports led to prediction of a massive cocoa shortage by 1960--1965 by
which point, on the contrary, a phenomenal increase in output and cocoa glut
had resulted from massive 1948--1958 plantings in response to high prices and
from farmer purchase of sprays and sprayers to control diseases.

16
the reverse appears to be the case--the majority of the proposed courses of
action would have impeded the ind us try 's growth and left Ghana with a weaker
and more fragile economy in the post-war period. This is the subject of the next
three sections.

III.
The Agriculture Department's Fears and ProposaJs
From 1900 to 1940 the Agriculture Department continuously expressed grave
dis.satisfaction over the state of the coco,;1 industry and suggested many far
reaching reforms1.

In 1917-18 their cr:i:tidsm culminated in a series of

Sessional papers 2 prepared to support their attempts to pass legislation to
remove the practices they deplored. The legislation they proposed would empower
the government to (i) require ·certa:tn standards of nainten.,,nce for fan;1s and
·to fine owners who allowed their farms to fall below this standard;

(ii) halt

further planting if thfs was deemed necessary; (iii) prohibit the export of

bad cocoa;

and

(iv) forbid the cutting <lown of Palrn and other tr.ees to make way

1 The 1915-1920 position of the Departrecnt was-dominated by the views
of Director W.S. D. Tudhope who authored-,j.:he Session al papers and who expressed
the fear, "I live in constant dread of disaster overtaking the industry."
Sessional paper No. 11, 1916-17. However, as both earlier and later state
ments show Tudhopes position differed in being more extreme rather than in
basic presuppositions and proposed lines of action.
2 sessional Papers 11 of 1916-17, a~d II and IV of 1918-19,

•
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for cocoa.

'lneir attempt failed, but though the intensity of their protests

then abated, their opinions were maintained and were reflected in their policies

well into the 1950's. 1
·Three central:: therr.es predominate; the first concerned the production
used in __ cocoa; _the second, .the :9uality of cocoa; the third, the
.
2
degree of specialization<:~.

_____ techniques

1)

Production technique
In the eyes of the agricultural department "peasant" techniques of productio:

and of disease control were inadequate and far inferior to the ones they pro
posed. They regularly termed the African methods as inefficient and wasteful
and complained that the farn:ers rejected new techniques--including lin:b-1,g--, peg
ging, and row planting to create "more productive" (neater and "more British"?)
farms. This view was particularly prevalent during the period of rapid develop
n~ent betwenn 1900 and 1925.

1

Far from enc<:>uraging this remarkable growth, the

Cf. Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture.

2 These were not the only issues· raised. The department was concerned with
the problem of rural indebtedness. We shall not discuss this problem in de- .
tail but our overall conclusions would not be affected if we did, for here as
elsewhere the department's evaluation was in large par_t erroneous. Unlike
Asia, which probably served the department as a model, the African cocoa
farmers are. not ground dmm by usurers. As subsequent investigations have
shown, there is a high correlation between total output and debt, indicating·
that it is the richer f aru:ers that are the most heavily indebted and the
overall ratio of debt to assets is not high. There are some cases where the
value of debt.is equal to the value of the farm, but there is a good deal
of evidence to suggest that the loans in this case are often a device for dis
guised sales and in .most case's the debtor has other farms for income. Cf.
Polly Hill, Mi~rant Cocoa Farn:ers E.E.· cit., and The Gold Coast Cocoa Farm-:..~,
Oxford, 1955; Report of the Committee on Agricultural Indebtedness, D~part
ment of Agriculture, Accra, 1958 (includes an historical summary of past reports
and proposals).

"'
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Agriculture Department felt it was proceeding too fast, that i.armers in a
rush· to get more and more acres under cocoa were overextending themselves and

not taking proper care of their farms.

Farmers, the Department asserted, made

their farms too large, had too many, and paid little attention to good cultiva--tion.

As a result, the -farms-were in a very poor state- and disease-was ram-----

pant. The department particularly deplored the African practice of .allowing

diseased farms to lie fallow instead of taking more active rehabilitory measures
"There is no argurr;ent" says the 1913 report
is "7asteful in the extreme."

11

ag 9;l:-nst the fact that the system

A quotation from the

1954 F.A.O. Report on Cocoa

provides a modern version in capsule form of the main line of argument against
peasant production,

1
"Since rational cul ti vat ion involves much more work
than the traditional type, the farmer, by means of social
propaganda., must be persuaded to place higher values
on economic and physical welfare and lower value on
leisure. 0

It was this view that led the department to request power to curtail production

and supervise techniques.
2.

Quality
The department also argued that poor preparation. of cocoa beans resulted

in inadequate quality and purity.

They argued that better quality cocoa fetched

higher prices in world markets, but the farmers paid little or no

attention to

quality or purity. This was attributed partly to farmer ignorance and partly
to refusal of buying firms to pay "adequate" differentials. The Acting Direcior

of Agriculture, W.S.D. Tudhope calling for legislative action in 1916-17 summed

up the main department arguments.
1

2

.
Cocoa, A Review, .QE_, cit., p. 21, 16.

2

.

Sessional Paper II, 1916-17.
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"The keen competition between rival firms and
·their entirely commercial outlook militates .
against their taking voluntary action ••• Peace
ful persuasion by the few available officers
of this department is not often successful •
••• legislation appears essential in order to
impose cultural reform upon a people incapable
of taking the necessary measures to ensure the
..future-prosperity 'of the industry by other methods. ___________ _
than that of coercion--a method which is inherently
familiar to them ••• 11
This concern vith quality·has remained an important preoccupation and lies be

hind the elaborate government inspectinn scheme in practice today and the con
tinued attempts to secure legislated price differentials as late as the 1950's.

3.

Overspecialization
Lastiyt

the goverx:n::ent feared that the farmer, attracted by the higher

returns in cocoa, was neglecting food crops and other export crops. Two quo··
tations from the Departn:en~ Report of 1916i and Cardinal's The Gold Coast of

19312 illustrate these views:
"(The present war time price collapse) may not be
an unmixed evil as it will be no doubt ~enporarily
at least check further planting of cocoa and may
have the result of aiding development or ressusci
tation of other (export) products and be the cause
of the introduction of a more rational system of
farming."

l!The Gold Coast peasant if he is to survive ••• must
ren:ember and always be taught to remerrher that the
crops which produce small but certain profits are
those on whic~ his existence depends, since they do
· not dra~,1 upon him the envious eye of the usurer or
the greedy one of the capitalist."

1 Government Printer, Accra.
2n,..

,!X_•

.

.E:,1,

•
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There is no doubt that in focusing on the question of productivity, disease
control, quality, and diversification the department was concentrating on the
crucial problems for an agricultural export economy. Similarly the demonstration

of errors in specific analysis and proposals, which we are about to present--,-

although rather alarming in summation--would not, by itself, constitute a basis

for fundamental rejection of the Agriculture Department's approach. The techni

cal and economic problems of tropical agriculture in an underdeveloped economy
are complex and available information limited making mis takes in detail not
only plausible but virtually inevitable. The basic criticism is that the· errors
were systematic and the programme irrelevant or harmful because of two funda
mental mistakes in concept and approach. First research efforts were totally
inadequate; instead reliance was placed on ad hoc attempts to tr.ansplant tech
nological methods from abroad without testing under Gold Coast conditions.
Second, economic and technical efficiency were consistently confused. The de
partment neith~~ understated nor paid attention to the economic reasons for
the behavior they observed nor did they seek to assess the overall economic con

sequences of the proposals they

fr..ade. These

two failings emerge clearly from an

analysis of each of the three issues.

IV
Research and Technology

Before discussing the specific proposals of the department on cocoa tech-

'
nology, we might briefly record the history of research facilities and
activities by the departiz.:::nt. Agricultura1.

i :,~-:

research by the government:·:·. began

in 1888 with the establishment by Governor Bradford Griff_ith of Aburi Bota11ical
Gardens to introduce new crops through local growing and distribution of
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seeds.

1

By 1890 they were experimenting with cocoa but failing. The curator

claimed the cliu:~te was unsuitable but in 1890 when Sir Beske th Dell, an Officer
with West Indian experience, visited the Gardens he pointed out that the cocoa

bad been planted on an eA'"})osed hillside with no shade, and this accounted for
--its fail~re ~2

'Ibis was the -level oI technology reached by the- government wheri

there was over 40 years experience in growing cocoa trees in the Gold Coast

by missionaries and at least 100-200 acres of African cocoa, some of it within

five miles of Aburi Gardens.
Until 1905 (in the words of the 1927 Committee on Agricultural Policy and
Organization) 3 "agricultural policy was limited to the importation of exotic
plants and observation of their behavior under local conditions. II

of crops, yields, or techniques of cultivation

No study

was attempted, instead there

was a confusion be tween agriculture and decora.ti vc horticulture. 4

1
p.

Despatch 28, August, 1888 ADH 1/489, cited by Polly Hill, £2.· cit.,

174.
211 Letter to the Editor" Times~ London, February 25, 1929, quoting

diary of October 1, 1890.
3 Report of the Committee on Agricultural Policy and Organization,
Sessional Paper XVII 1927-1928, Part II-D.

4 Ibid. The Chairman of the Committee was Deputy Director of
Agriculture G.C. Auchinleck suggesting that its very sharp criticism of
the 1890-1927 record was shared by at least sorr.e senior Agriculture Departm2nt
staff.
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In 1905 the D~partr:ent was reorganized but from then through 1920 em
phasis was placed on instruction and demonstration without iocal research, 1
Indeed the 1919 Report. as well as making the standard complaint that cocoa
had developed with out the "necessary" regulation admitted "the fact that one
cannot record any valuable_ addition made by the Department .to the science. of
agriculture", while the 1920 Annual Feport (p .5) expressed the hope that the
reorganization of that year would allow adequate technical work to be instituted
But though the expansion of the 1920 's included ten main projects, only
two concerned cocoa: one an intensified local instruction scheme in Ashanti
and the other 40 acre model cocoa farm for intensive cultivation at Asamankese.
Substantially larger allocations wept to a 1,000 acre sisal plantation and to
three coconut plantations totalling 900 acres. 3

The Agriculture Policy and

Programme Report pointed to deficient "provision for intensive investigational

work .• -. The- Department assurr;ed that the domain of investigation lay in the
laboratory and not in the experiment station." Further it noted "agricultural

1

.

In 1905, the Department staff consisted of 3 curators, 3 African
Overseers, and 2 African Garden Assistants. while even in 1915 it m1<-nbered
only 1 administrator, 17 gardens staff (7 European), 1 Inspector, 13 Af tican
field instructors, @d 2 technically trained agricultural research and tech
nical officers. By 1922 the technical officers had risen to six. (Ibid and_
Annual Reports, 1905, 1915, 1920. 1921, 1922,) Examination of Gold Coast Civil
Service Lists for the 1920 1 s and 1930's further reveals that a distinct
minority of the officers had any West Indian--or indeed any tropical--exper
ience before being posted to West 1ffrica. In 1922 for example one had West
Indian experience and one had served briefly in Ceylon. The majority c2.me
direct from Biritish agricultural or technical colleges.
•
2 Agriculture tepartment~ Annual Report 1919, Gold Coast Governrr.ent,

Accra, l.921.
· 3Annual Report 1920 ~ p. 8.

'Ihe question of allocation is important be
cause the persistent concentration on non-cocoa (and in most cases non-economic)
crops renders rather tmconvincing the defense frequently advanced that the Da
partment sought additional funds for cocoa research. Quite clearly its pre1937 cocoa research programrr.e could have been increased several fold hacl not sis
palm oil, coconut, cotton, ancl tr.echanized rice cul ti v.ation been· viewed as having
higher priority than cocoa work.
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stations are in the hands of junior and partly trained overseers."

for change from

In calling

a "limited Policy of _protection of existing ind us tries to one

I

of resource development''it trnrned "neither in organization, nor in staff, nor
in facilities is the Department fully prepared~,!

Thus, during the crucial

years of cocoa e:x--pansion, the Department was neither inclined nor capable of
investigating in a scientific manner the best way to grow cocoa.

With so

little research, it is not surprising that the Department's proposals. were

faulty.
The main thrust of the department's news on techniques centered on a call

for intensive cultivation, i.e., lining arid pegging, neat rows and cleaii
weeding, ditching, open uniformly dry fields, etc. To the department the
farmers use of less careful techniques was due to short sightedness, ignorance,
and a single minded search for "the attainment. of the maximum amount of money

with a minimum expc:nditure of energy, however uneconomical the system.''

2

The farmer, on the other hand, rejected intensive cultivation because it
economized on land which was plentiful and not on labour which was scarce.
Thus, the quarrel was in part over differing evaluations of what was to be
maximized and what minimized.

It was however also due to the departRent's

inaccurate assumption that no serious work of maintaining farms was done be
tween harvest 3 and its untested hypothe-sis that the Uest Indian techniques woulc'
lower Gold Coast costs even though the latter were already lower than the forme1:

1 sessional Pap~r, XVII, 1927-28.
I

2

•

Sessional Paper, No. XI, 1916-17.

3 c£. Cardinall, ..QE.• cit., Hill, ..<2£.• cit. and Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer,
Oxford, 1955; Dina, Gilletti, and Baldwin, ..<2£.• cit.

24
Ironically, they dld not apply thei.r valid warning that extensive cleclring
might lower moisture content and injure long-run prospects

1

to their own

schemes for neat rows, separated trees, and clean weeding all of which ten.cl
•
2
·· to i ncrease water 1 oss an d erosion.

_The· two. other main criticisms; that farms were wastefully scattered and· ·_
that temporarily abandoning diseased farms was an inadequate measure for
disease control were answered by the department's own submissions. Regarding
the larger number of dispersed farms Sessional Paper II, 1918-19 noted that:

"Amongst Akwapim it was probably occasioned by the
limited supply of (nearly) suitable land ••• (and
was) also due to native shrewdness, for, as they
have frequently explained in planting cocoa • , • it
·being a new crop • • • they thought it best to plant
in many localities •.• to ensure some of these being
successful. 11

While the Agriculture Department by the late 1920 1 s and 1930's could give
some relevant advice on suitable land for cocoa, they were of little help at
the time this was written. 3
On the question of disease control, the department admitted that the

. "fallowing" rr.e thod of disease control "almost invariably. leads ·to complete
recovery"

4

which would seem an excellent justificat:J.cin.• The Departrr.ent also

1 Ibid, pp. 19-20!"

2 cf. Dina, Gilletti,Daldwin, op, cit.-, D. W. Urquhart, Co~,
Longrnans Green, London, .1961,
•
3
. .
Local selection methods are defective especially in checking for
hardpan. Cf, P.S. Hanmond "Cocoa: Agronomy'' in J.B. Wills (ed.) Agriculture
and Land Use in Ghana, Oxford, 1962.

4

Sessional Paper II, 1916-17, Government Printer, Accra •

..,
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believed that infos ted areas provided sources for spread of harmful insects
and/or vi ruses. But, while important to plantation or other solid cultivation
areas, this concern did not prove true in the ·cold Coast where most cocoa
farms were separated by forest and/or foodcrops.

In any event, the diseases--

with the_ two exceptions_ of capsid and swollen shoot--pr_Qy~<l__m~nor1 an_d_ i~-- __ _

no case did the Agricti.lture Department discover a cure. 2

Swollen shoot and

capsid were serious threats beginning in the mid-1920 1 s but were not inten
sively studied until after WACRI's founding in 1937 and not controlled until
the 1950 1 s. 3
In summary, the Department's recommendations on techniques of production
"ts'Cre ill advised. As subsequent re~earch showed, the Ghana cocoa farmer,
using rr.ethods he developed himself achieved parallel or better productivity
at distinctly lower costs than those achieved elsewhere by the methods pro

posed by the DepartTient.

No prima facie case whatsoever was made that his

1

_ Cf. Urqur..art, .Q.£• cit., and P. F. En twhis tel "Minor Insect Pests", in
Wills • .QE... cit.
2 w.H. Beckett in his comments cites sankonuabe (Twi for "go back to

oil palms "--a baring insect) as having been controlled by Department action,
Department reports suggest that the attacks were first overestimated and then
receded with no real control found necessary.
3narr.mond estimates loss· of farms (seedlings killed) from caps id as per
haps 50% prior to control in the late 1950 's--an excellent reasnn for scat
tering new farms. Before 1937 little research was done on this pest and con
trol rr.easures dates to 1954. Its importance appears to have been gravely
underestimated. Beckett, for example, re"iates the low growth and indeed de
cline of cocoa in the Western Region to lack of transport. It now appears
· from interviews with farners by Polly Hill the basic reason was heavy capsid
infestation killing new and son:etimes even established cocoa. Certainly, since
capsid control was achieved, Wes tern planting and output has risen rapidly.
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techni.ques were economically inefficient.

Polly Hill's e:xtensive and authori-

1tative investigation of the Gold Coast farrr:.ers show that far from being tra
dition bound and unadaptive he was ''forward looking, prospective, provident,
pntd~ntial • 111

When in 1936-37, an expert evaluation of productivity was made,

- -the -author, C.Y. Shepherd found:
"The brief description of methods of cocoa
cultivation in the Gold Coast shows that
--tbe farmer has adopted few of those ex
pensive operations which planters in Trinidad and Grenada consider necessary for the main
tenance of yields and profits ••• (but) it is a
fairly safe assumption that the yield in the
Gold Coast is at least twice that obtained in
Trinidad and equivalent to that obtained by
intensive rr.e thods in Grenada. i:2

A direct test of the efficiency of the economic efficiency of the methods ad
vocated by the Agriculture Department is found in the experience of Euro
pean cocoa plantations in the Gold Coast during the period 1906-1935. At
least six plantations were launched and at least four carr.e into production.
Two, including one owned by the United Africa Company, were cited as using
modern methods and efficient_managerr.ent and equipment. By the middle of. the
1930's even these two had incurred such heavy losses as to be closed--the

1 Polly Hj_ll, Higrant Cocoa Far!:'.ers, op, cit., p. 179, but the theme
is reiterated and amply documented in her many writings on the subject.
From her analysis, it emerges that "agricultural capitalist" rather than
11 peasant" provides
the more appropriate description of the Gold Coast
cocoa f arrr.er.

2

.

ReEort on the Economics of Peasant Agriculture in the Gold Coast,
Governrr.ent Printer, Accra, 1936, para. 16.

•
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UAC plantation being given to the.Gold Coast Government.which--instead of
using it as a test site--turned it over to Achimota School. 1

The diffi

culties facing the p~antations included labour shortages but appeared to
center on the fact that their regular plan tings, heavy weeding and maintenBnce expendituress high overhead for management and drying equiprr.ent, and
relatively high wage bill per acre ( the plantations by definition had no
core of family labour). were not offset to any subs tan ti al degree hi~liJgqf!.r
yields per tree or per acre. As a result the cost per load of cocoa vas dis
tinctly above that of the African farmer and, by and large, also well above
the merchant house buying price.

In short, the Department was not able to

offer--any alte.rnative method of production that was economically more
efficient either for African farmers or for plantations. Even today, though
the yields obtained in the West African Coccia Research Institute test plot:s
are far higher than those achieved by the farmer, these involve high costs in
fertilizers, labour and skilled management, and their economic efficiency
has not been established.

2

In contrast, sprays and faster growing trees

1Annual Reports. 1922-1934, passim, also Ormsby-Gore Report ( Cmd. 2,
2744, 1926, pp. 152-3 and Sir K. Hancock, Survev of British Commonwealth
Affairs, Vol. II, Pt. 2, London, 19
, pp. 188, 192. Unsatisfactory plantation experience has been the rule, not the exception, in {Jest African
cocoa, European Ivory Coast and Cameroon plantations--despite provision of
conscripted labour--almost all failed in the 1930's but large as well as
sm~ll African Fam$ survived.

2

.
.
Discussion with WACRI officers from both Ibadan and New Tafo
·stations.
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developed since 1945 have been widely and rapidly accepted without coerd.on. 1
The best summary of the Agricultural Department's contribution to cocoa
technology prior to the establishment of WACRI remains that of the expert
· independent 1938-39 survey which found it 2
•~xtraordinary that until 1937 there was no
single agricultural station in the cocoa
belt proper at which research could be
carried out on the ,::r.equirements of the
crop. · It is difficult to see how any
officer of the Department co4ld be expected
to offer correct advice on cultural.or other
treatn:ent> as he had no opportunity to acquire
knowledge under local conditions. 11
Equally the 1927 view of Governor Gordon Guggisberg~
Although there are certain defects in our
cocoa industry these are all rerrcediable and
there need not be the slightest doubt about
the future. Our production is steadily going
up. 'Ihere is a noticeable improvement in the
farms and in the p·reparation of cocoa.
,~as and remains a far more realistic appraisal than agricultural expert
"cocoa pessimism" based on supposedly basic problems of disease control,
cultivation techniques, farmer laziness,· or market collapse.

1 cf. Economic Survev of Ghana. Government Printer, Accra, Annual
1955 e t ~ passim. Discussions with farmers suggests that some have adopted
row planting but are in doubt whether ease of cultivation and plucking
offsets the higher initial costs.
·
2 . .
H.C. Sampson and E. M. Crowther, "Report on Crop Production and •
Soil Fertility Problems" ih The West African Corr:mission 19 38-39, Technical
Reports, Leverhulm Trust, London, 1943, pp. 39-40.

3

.

Annual Address, legislative Council Debates 1927-28, Government
Printer, Accra, 1928> p. 52.
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V

The Quality View
On the issue of quality, the Departu:ent's views were opposed 1:ioth to

those of the farmers and those of the merchants. The Department wished the

farmers to use better tr.ethods of ferir.en tation and to take more care in_ re
moving defective beans in order to improve the quality and purity of the
e>.-port crop. They also wanted the merchants to help them bring this about

by paying a higher premium for higher quality cocoa and thus provicl:!..ng

an economic incentive to the farmer. Since neither complied completely,
the Depar.tment sought and to some extent achieved legislation to enforce
its point of view.
The concern over quality can be traced to the very first report of the
Botanical and Agricultural Department in 1906.
"T'ne quality of cocoa appears to deteriorate
yearly. This ·is largely due to plants being
raised from immature beans, and to the ignorance
of the natives in the proper method of preparjng
their crop. Practical instruction to the natives
is at present impossible, oweirig to this Department
being so much understaffed. 11
Since the mercha...~ts paid a flat price for all acceptable cocoa, the
African farn:ers were unwilling to improve purity by detailed picking· over

of beans or purch·as~ of fermenting equiprr.ent.

In their submissions the

~

'
merchants agreed that West African cocoa was not first grade but held it was
suitable for certain markets_. A provisional schen:e for picking over cocoa in
order to separate it into first and residt!e grades fell through when lt was
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found that the first grade would fetch only bl.5 a tor

more than the un

picked and the loss on the residue grade would substantially exceed this gain
(quite ap1:1rt from costs to farmers of separation and the costs to firms of -inspection),

1

_In 1907 the Departrr.ent .lllade trial shipments of specially fermented and
picked cocoa to "prove" that to pay premiums for higher quality was economically
souncl. Typically, they made no effort to estimate tre costs of the special pre
paration noting only that they received a London price of 167.7 per ton

for

their few tons of high quality cocoa as opposed to the "prevailing" price of
~65 per ton for Gold Coast cocoa. As they sold in five lots at prices ranging

from I:.65.. to h70 per ton in a rising market, the existence of any differential
seems hypothetical.

2

In 1908 report notes the Ghana am~lona<lo was recogni~ed as second grade,

but the plants were hardy and fruitful. Quality, Tudhope claimed, could be
raised to first grade (West Indian criollo) if differential prices encouraged
proper care.

3

Here and later an utter confusion between in trisically different

cocoas is at its most evident. The West Indian criollo is a ·fine quality cocoa
used in limited quantities for flavouring mixed cocoas.

The Amerlonads type

grown in Ghana was used for bulk and had a much larger demand. The two types

1

See G. C. DuQgion The Agricultural and Forest Products of British West
Africa, Empirical Institute Handbook, John 'Murray, London, 1911, pp, 50-

2

.

•Botanical and Agricultural Department, Annual Report, ~907.

3Agricultural Department, ~nnual Report, 1908.

•

31
are not direct substitutes on the demand side but are in fact different commodi
ties and rather more complements than substitutes.

The departmental reports,

however, persistently composed the price of the two and cited movements in the
differentials between them as evidence of changes in the quality of Ghana

.

--eocoa--a patently absurd conclusion.
Subsequent reports

2

1

erephasiz ed the need for better methods of drying and

fermentation. This was--and to a minor extent is--a genuine problem. But the
Department's constructive role was very limited. The gradual solution through
improved use of the African open pile technique--now agreed to be satisfactory
if properly carried out

3

--seems to have come more by sharing of experience

amongst the farmers and company refusal to buy improperly fermented cocoa than
from Department action.
The 1916-1919 period marked a peak in concern over quality with the demnnds

for legislation forbidding export of "low quali ty 11 cocoa even though firms

could find a market for it. 4

The Departrr.ent cited as proof of the need for

legislation firm staterr.entss:iying they paid low and occasional or no differen
tials because the difference in London price of !;2-3 per ton (between best •and
normal Hes t African) would not sustain additional handling and supervision cos ts
and leave a useful buying differential.

5

Rough computations suggest that a 6d

to 9d load might have been obtarned for very intensively picked over cocoa, but

the cost from discarding beans would exceed the gain in unit price even ignoring
the labour involved.

1see, for example, the rather late repetition of this, Memorandum on the
Creation of a Fund for I mu roving the Ouali ty and Marketing of Cocoa I Sessinnal
Paper XVIII, 1930-31, para. 19.

2f..g~ 1912, 1914.
3
See Urquhart,

'2E..- cit., Chapter X, Hau:mond r:cocoa: Agronomy", .2.£.· c:f.t.

4sessional Papers II 1916-17, II & V, 1918-19, ££· cit.·
5 sessional Paper IV. 1918-19·,

.£E_, cit.,

pp. 7-8.
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A few quotations from Tudhope's justification of the need for coercion to
improve quality are instructive for the contrast they reveal between the criteri~
of the Department and those of the f arn:ers and the merchants.

It will be noted

that in both cases Tudhope's criticism amounts to the charge that African

.

- --Farc:.ers and European Firms are lliaximizing profits.

1

•~est Ind:i.an cocoa producers are either Europeans,

or of European extraction, or nre sufficiently
intelligent to accept European rr:ethdds; the pro
ducers of cocoa in this colony arid Ashanti are
natives in a most elementary state of civiliza
tion whose :sole aim, as yet, appears to be the
attainrr.ent of a maximum amount of money with a
minimum expenditure of eney;gy, however uneconorni
~al the .sys tern, and whose lack of foresight for
the future welfare of the inclustry--and conse
quently of themselves--has not yet been compen
sated by adequate legislative measures ••. (At
St. Thome cocoa is better than Gold Coast cocoa
with the same .labour,) .•. but ·there dec:i.ded
Eeasures of coercion obtain under European con
trol."

"The keen competition between rival firms and
their entirely commercial outlook militates
against them taking voluntary action. 11

and
"Peaceful persuasion by the few av.ailable offi
cers of this Departrnen t" -- is not often success
ful ••• and legislation appenrs essential in
order to impress necessary cultural reforms
upon a people incapable of taking the necessary
measures to ensure the future prosperity of the
industry by other methods than that of coercion-
a method which is inherently familiar to them."

•

1 1916-17, Sessional Paper II.
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Governor Clifford rejected the proposals

1

"to prevent owners of produce from offering for
sale, and merchants from buying cocoa which it pays
one to sell and the other to buy is an arbitrary
interference with trade and with private rights
and discretion which could only conceivably::be
justified if the course. pursued were proved to
be doi,ng some vital injury to the ind us try as a
whole and to the Colony as a cocoa-producer. This
has not in any sense been proved at the present
time."

During the 1920 's "Accra fine fermented'' became· the basic world cocoa
standard, evidence--at the least--that Gold Coast quality was not such as
to threaten the future of the industry.

Misleading comparisons with the

prices for intrinsically different West Indian cocoa ~ontinued, 2 however, and
isolated rejections of Gold Coast shiprr,ents were cited as dire portents.

In

fact these rejections appear to have been largely (or perhaps entirely) of
cocoa held too long in the Gold Coast (especially during the World War I
shipping crisis) or in bond abroad (as in certain 1963-1964 U.S. cases follow
ing the peak 1961 crop).
Nonetheless, the Department continu~"d to seek action along two main lines
(1) cooperatives controlled by the farmers and (2) cor,1pulsory grading to raise
quality. Both t.rere viewed by merchants and farmers alike as costly nuisances.

1

.

Gold Coast, Sessi.onal Papers II. 1916-:-17, Government Printer
Accra, (As Governor Guggisberg did on similar grounds in 1927-28.
Coast, Legislative Council Debates 1927-28, p. 51.
2 E.g. Sessional Paper XVIII, 1930-31, .QE.• cit.

Gold
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From 1928 to 1938 extensive efforts were made to develop cooperatives
selling

. 1

11

quality cocoa"; indeed it was a _major activity of the Department.

The cooperatives failed to achieve a volume of· even 10,000 tons (of 250-350 ,000)
- of the total during the period before the war.
. 3
as governrr.ent run an d uneconomic.

2

They were criUcized in 1936

The Nowell Commission findings clearly

tmderline the reasons for their failure: 4
11 A Cooperative society receives for its cocoa only 6d.
more (per 60 pound load) than is obtained by outside
producers ••• (deducting expenses) the cooperative pro
ducer thus makes an average ioss of 5-3/4d. per load .••
cooperative producers have not profited by their addi
tional expenditure and labour ••• We think that the propa
ganda in the early stages of the Cooperative Movement
laid undue emphasis on very high standards of quality
and that hopes not justified by market conditions were
raised."

In contrast to

this early attempt, after 1945, sales of cooperatives

organized to make profits on buying iommissions instead of losses on quality
rapidly rose to 50,000 tons in 1956 (of

218,000) and to over 100,000 tons

(of less than 300,000) in the later 19SO's, 5

In 1934, a Cocoa Industry Regulation Ordinance, setting minimum stand-.
arcls and grades was finally adopted. The inspection scheme. of this ordinance
has remained in force with little positivel:enefit. The Nowell Commission founa6

1

See K.K. Appeadu, ~otes on the History of the Gold Coast Cooperative
Hovement, De~artment of Agriculture, Accra, 1956.

2

Appeadu, .2£.· cit., p, ~.
3
.
Shepherd, Econo1I1ics of Peasant Agriculture, E.E_. cit.

4

Cmd. 5 845, ££.• cit.

5 App~ridv,.2E.• cit., 1924.
6 colonial Office, Report of:·the Commission on the Marketing of West
African Cocoa, Crnd. 5845, ..QE.• d.t,.

•
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"The firms do not conceal their view that it (the Ordinance)
entails a waste of time and money especially as the larger
firms have their own grades which cut across those of the
government. The producers and brokers are at present not
affected by the system since there is in general no pay
ment of differential prices for quality> although an indi
vidual who bri~Is in well prepared cocoa •.• may get a
·
small premium. 1
In the pos t-irnr, the Ghana Cocoa Marke ting Bo~rd has replaced the private
merchants but has equally held (with one brief and inconsequential exceptionl_
that quality premia were uneconomic.

The Board has never hai:1::1to reject a

· significant quality of cocoa as sub-grade.

2

Ironically, the grading and inspection scheme has resulted in a lower
ing of the quality of cocoa. Since very bad qunli ty was not bought and good
cocoa received no premiura, it paid to mix the.bad with the good and sell it
as second grade, a practice the Department was ·still complaining about in its
annual reports in the 1950's.

1neckett comments that Cadbury and· Fry and the Eastern and Scottish
Cooperative t~1olesale Society did pay differentials and have higher acreage
quality. He also notes that Liverpool experts (a) stated a preference for
better cocoa quality and purity and (b) selected a Gold Coast e>.."Perfoent
station sample as being of the highest standard among African farmer and
agricultural station cocoa. No one would dispute that manufacturers
"wanted" better cocoa at the same price, but the fact remains that their pre
·. ference was not great enough to lead to a price differential covering
additional production cost.
•
.
'
2 chana Cocoa Marke tin,:: Board Annual Fe ports, Oddly enough in early
postwar years when sub-grade was somewhat larger in volume, it was sold to
the local cocoa butter mill and the cocoa butter exported, a practice still
followed in the Can:e roon Republic.
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VI
The Diversification Issue

The diversification issue can be treated more summarily.

In part it

rested on a belief that the cocoa expansion created domestic food shortages,

as evidenced by the growing importation of food.

Neither the- factual basis

nor the economic logic of this concern is clear.

In the context of an open economy if it pays the farmer to grow an export
crop and buy imported food rather than grow his own food the decision to

specialize in the e7.Port is economically sound while an attempt to promote
self-sufficiency for its own sake is not • 1

Moreover, there was in fact little

evidence of any such shortage in traditional crops. There were occasional
problems of supplying food to urban areas, but this was not the case in cocoa
t,

areas for the reason that food growing is partly complementary to cocoa; cer

tain food crops are a byproduct of cocoa _plan ting while others require labour

in the seasons where cocoa does not.

2

Gold Coast food imports never amounted

to 5% of total food consumptton and were heavily concentrated in products the

Gold Coast could not readily produce or could produce only at high cost.

Food

and cocoa production are complementary rather than competitive. ·The two de
tailed surveys cited earlier show the typical food farrr.cr without cocoa to
cultivate one or two food farms while the typical cocoa had two to four food
·
- cocoa f arms.
· J
. i ona 1 f o.o d pro d uction
f arms an d a dd 1.t
on

Opening of new cocoa

.
1Similar pleas--rerniniscent of the lost battle of England to save the
Corn Laws--were endemic. In a number of colonies, Ceylon and ~-Ialaya in parti
cular, sought to reduce rice imports ( from another British colony, Burma) some
times even at the expense of higher i~come yielding smallholder export crops.

2

.

Ironically, the Annual Plan ( 1965) , Government Prin te. r, Accra, p. 15 cites
the falling off in ~ocoa planting and its byproducts of reducing interpl~nted
food output as a source of pressure on the food supply.

3

.

.. . ·:,Computed from Qda-Swedru-Asnmnnkese and Ashanti Surveys, .Q.E..• cit .
..:
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fams is particularly closely tied to production of plantain and cocoyam which

are used as cover crops during the initial two to three years to protect the
seedling cocoa trees.

1

Indeed in 1965 the Annual Plan cites the reduction in

new cocoa planting as a contributory factor to food shortages in 1963 and
-1964.

2

In practice, the Department di<l relatively little to encourage expansion
3

of domes tic food. Research on basic root crops was particularly deficient •
The 1920-27 capital expenditure programme of the Department shows, for example,
li6% on new export crops, 31% for "sanitation" (introducing British clean

weeding, ditching, and orderly planting patterns), 10% for forestry and fire
wood production, 0% for cocoa, and 3% for local food crops and even that limited
.
4
.
to mechanized· upland. rice cultivation. No effort was made to· stimulate modern

fishing, ranching, or fish and meat tinning although meat and fish in various
forms ranked with flour, sugar, and tinned milk among the leading food imports.
The argument for diversification also rested on a fear of overspecializa

tion in export crops. The premises advanced were sound; the demand for cocoa
could be expected to level off or ut any r~te grow slowl:;!, and cocoa prices .were
1 A point emphasized by Polly Hill in discussion with the authors.

2 Gove·mltient Printer, Accra, 1965, p. 15.
3At a forest zone agricultural st~tion visited by one of the authors
in 1961, the chief crop was indeed a root_ crop--Irish potatoes. For two
. decades these had been grown with poor size, low yield, and constant need
for new planting materials, pnd a probable cost of !:.1-2 per pound with thQ only
apparent gain being to the local senior officers' diet.

4

Gold Coast, Le~islative Council Debates, 1927-28, p. 276.
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highly unstable. The first premise was often pushed to the point of undue

:

pessimism as in 1918-19:

1

the production of cocoa is already approaching the ¥Orld 's
requirements, so ••• a continued expansion of output might
cause a serious lowering in the value of the commodity to
such an extent it would no lon~er be profitable to the
producers and it is worthy of serious consideration
whether restriction is not necessary from the point of
view above.::
11

In any case, restriction by the Gold Coast above would--even give its

40% market share--not have been adequate to maintain prices.

The most strik

ing ·results of the actual use of similar ta·ctics. in rubber during the 1930 's
was to halve Malaya's share of the market by 1940 and to hinder her postuar
.

expansion of rubber output when demand was bouyant.

2

Govenor Guggisberg phrased the problem more realistically in 1919: 3
we have nearly all our eggs in one basket. The cocoa
baskets are full--what about the other baskets? Hhere
are the other products to fill those baskets--if an-)thing
goes vrong with the cocoa crop or the cocoa market?"
The conclusion that the G'old Coast should diversify into other export
crops--no more broadly based development policy was seriously considered 4--

1
2

Sessional Paper IV, .2.E.· cit., p. 20.

Cf. Bauer, Rubber Industry, £2.· cit., Silcock, ~1alayan Economics, .2£· cit.

3 Legislative Council Debates. 1919-20, p. 7.
4 'Ihis is not to 'the discredit of the Gold Coast colonial staff as such.
Imperial economic organizatio•n did not envisage such changes in Hest Africa.
Under Go;-?!Prnor Guggisberg the Gold Coi:ist did have an economic plan of so::1e
sophistication. However, its bnsic dynamics were increases in trade leading
to increases in govern.a-rnent revenue expended on public works to promote further
eh~ort exp~~sion and on health and education to raise the level of African
job potential and welfare. (Cf. Governor Cuggisb\'.?rg's Annual Mdress to
· Legislative Council in Le.~islative Council E'ebates .1919--20 .to 1927-28). The
Volta River dam was considered but dropped l_argely because no use for the
volu~e of pow~r necessary to make _it economic could be envisage~.
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does not follm,1 from these premises.

It represents the Colonial Government

version of the Hvrld Bank Mission fallacy, that salvation for prit11ary product
exporters lies in diversifying competitively into each others present 1:1.nes of
-export. Tne Cold Coast encouraged coffee and rubber, Malaya and Ceylou en-~ouraged· cocoa and ~il_palms, and similarly in other colonies.

In that indi~

vidual primary product price changes are rarely widely divergent during major
cyclical swings and that the de_mand growth and price trend for cocoa has

'

been at least as satisfactory as for the typical tropical agricultural product over the period 1900-1965 (or 1915-1965) the case for.diversification is
no clearer in retrospect than it was in the 1920' s when demand grew and prices

.

moved ~rraticaliy sideways.

1

What stabilization among primary

exports i-1as possible--or better s tabilibeen
zation among primary and manufactured goods--could much better have /sought on
a sterling area basis · ·throu_gh territorial specialization and pooling of
short-run gains and losses. This line of action ~ms, in fact, never seriously
considered.
J..s opposed to the dubious potential gc>,tns, di versifica.tion had clear

present costs.

It diverted limited funds away from cocoa research, e.g. on

capsids which were identified in the.1920 1 s but not seriously studied with

a view to control until HACRI's foundin~. 2

Similarly, it was in practice,

1 see P_. Lamartine-Yates, Forty Years of Foreign Trade, Allen and Um-1in,
London, 1959, passim (price levels and trend; for various er.ops). Even with
the post 1960 price collapse Ghana's cocoa and cocoa product export earnings
~ave risen steadiiy from t67.8 million in 1960 to t76-7S million in 1965,
while total export earnings have stagnated. The 1960-1965 cocoa series is
67.8, 70.7, 70.8, 71.7, 72.8, 76-7e. Econoreic Surveys 1961,.1964.

2 Cf. C,G. Johnson, "Capsids" -2£.· cit.

..,

a substitute to research and local food crop techniques and costs. This
would have been justified had it succeeded in finding major new eash crops
but it did not.

. 1
The reasons for the failure are clear in Department and project reports.
Returns to labour and capital were simply not commensura_te wi_th those avail-:
able in cocoa. Eastern Region farmers had--to the horror of the Agriculture
Department--neglected and occasionally even cut down oil palms to plant cocoa
because it paid better; it was idle to expect them to switch into sisal or
coconut palms which were even less competitive. Even costing capital at 4-1/2%
(below what a local farm.er could expect in cocoa) and underestimating govern
ment officer time used (or at any_ rate

c_harged) most of the plantations made

losses in all but their best one or -t:wo years. Hi th a 10% capital charge and

full costing of executive time a uniform record of losses would almost cer
tainly have been shmm.

Despite tnis record and the uniformly unsatisfcictory

record of private plantations 3 , the Department believed at least until the
1930 1 s that its plantations could be turned over to Gold Coast chiefs and/or
stimulate them to establish similar estates.
1 In addition to Annual Report~ see e.g. Report on Communal Coconut
Pl~ntations, Sessional Pauer X, 1921-22, Correspondence Belating to the Develo·
ment of the Oil Palm Industry, Sessional Paper IV, 1924-25; Dispatch Relating
to the Oil Palm Industry, No. 665, 1929.
2 see Annual:"B.eports, 1921, et. seg. and Legislative Council Debates._
1924, g.
passim, e.r,. 1927-28, pp. 46-60.

™''

3 'Ihe 1932-33 Annual Report surnrr.ed -~P the plantation record fairly ;hen
it commented' 1 There have been but a few plantation ventures in the Gold
Coast and they h~ve in general not been sufficiently successful to encourage
further development. The fall in the price of raw material products has now
rendered such propositions unattractive."
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In its diversification efforts as in its cocoa programrr..e the Department
appears to have been hampered by lack.of an adequate research and knowledge
base. The 1938-39 West African Commission Report astringently notes:

1

''The Department of Ap,riculture has been sinp;ularly unfortu
nate in its legacy of agricultural stations. Except in
the -Northem Territories, none of them appears to be ;!;ypical
of the country which it is intended to serve.,:
···

It seems highly doubtful that primary export diversification has been
I

of value to those African states with more varied commodity baskets. Commenting
2
on th is question II. t-J. Ord concludes :
"Ghana seems to have done better·from her heavy dependence
on cocoa ••• than Uganda, uith a more diverse range of
agricultural commodities, none of Phich account for a large
proportion of world trade-in sharp contrast to Ghana's
leading world position in cocoa."

VII

The failings of the Gold Coast Agriculture Department and the achievements
of Ghanaian -cocoa farmers derr.onstrate neither that small farmers can surmount
the problems of raising tropical aericulture unaided nor that modern agricul
ture experimentation and technological developments when properly costed are
irrelevant.

However, they do justify d·rawing certain conclusions about the

strengths and \1eaknesses of tropical family farmers and of colonial agricul;..
tural policies. These conclusions appear to be of a fairly broad interest in

•

1

Sampson and· Crowther, "Report on Crop Production and Soil Fertility
.QE.• cit. 1 pp. 40-41.

Problems''

21 'Agricultural Commodity Projections, 'Peal Growth and Gains from
Trade" in Stewart and Ord (Editors), African Primary Products and Inter.national
·Trade, Edinburgh, 1965, p. 111.
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that the du~l (or even duel) record of rap:i.d expansion of cash crops by indigen
ous f anners and of largely ineffective or worse agricultural policy is preva
lent both in !-Jest Africa and Southeast Asia and the attitudes and approaches
-involved often have been substantially adopted by independent African and
.•
1
As
1.an states.

1)

Ghanaian cocoa farmers have acted with a high de8ree of economic rationality,

a fairly long time horizon, and a substantial propensity to reinvest in the
industry;

2)

They have adopted and adapted techniques--inclucling some entailing capital

outlays--when these appeared likely to be or had been proven by other f arrr;ers

to be ec6now.ically sound~
3)

They have--predictably--not been able to carry out scientific ·researcb, to

operate disease control schemes in which social benefits exceed costs , but
there is a private loss to the farmers directly concerned, nor to regulate
industry output in a manner consistent with maximizing total receipts once the
growth of demand slackened;

4)

Gold Coast Agdcultural progral!1TleS consistently emphasized introduction

(by education or coercion) of new techniques and orgartizational patterns with
out testing their technical suitability, much less their economic viability,
under local conditions; 2

1 The authors are personally familiar i.,ith parallel cases- in Figeri.!. Uganda,
The Carr.eroon Republic, Ceylon, Burma, and Malaysia. In general independent
states have been more sympathetic to farrr.ers but not necessarily better in
formed on rural institutions. of techniques. They have frequently embarked on
large scale institutional and technical chan?-es borrowed from temperate countries
with neither substantial local (tropical) testing nor serious costing studies.
2 The result of such a policy is likely to be the creation of skepticisr.1 and

caution on the part of farIT.ers. If the past record of agricultural "expert"·
proposals is poor and especially if the farmer in question has suffered by intro
ducing one, the maxim ''once burnt, twice shy;; will tend to govern. This, however,
is a criticism of attempted genernlization of unproven innovations not of farn,er
attitudes.
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5)

Ghanaian farmer techniques were assumed faulty whenever they diverged from

. agricultural service proposals. The farmers' economic motivation was either
denied or derided when: (usually cost increasing and net revenue decreasing)
.technical changes were rejected;

6)

Systematic study of Gold Coast practices and institutions from the point

of view of finding out how µi_d why they worked and in what way they could be
j

adapted to improve an already successful industry was not

.undertaken and

apparently never even seriously contemplated because of the basic negative
attitude toward the Ghanaian farn:er (and to a lesser degree toward the buying
farms as well) ;
7)

Basic research on cocoa--until the founding of HACRI in 1937--was virtually

non-existent despite the fact that Gold Coast African results were at least
as good as West Indian or Brazilian plantation ones and that no improverr.ent

on the local '·fallowing 1; for disease control was known;
8)

Diversification proposals either called for a loss of current incomes

for little, if any, gain in stability throu.gh growing alternate export cropq

or erroneously poSj_ted that cocoa expansion was hindering the growth of domestic food production.
Both in terms of economic rationality and calculation and of relevant
technical and institutional knowledee and _adaptability the Gold Coast cocoa
farrr:ers--despite very real lirnitations--had significantly better records than
I

the Department of Agriculture throughout the period 1890-1940.
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1903/091912/13

1913/141917/18

119.9

151.3
63.1

130.5
58.6

192. 7

73.6

li5.6

187.4
37.4

13.5

25-.3

31.8

45.3

56.3

23.4

2lf. 3

37.3

42.8

37.7

6.5
1
6
7
17.6 • • 17.5

13-.9
20.1

10.3

20. 9

32.3

12.3

37.3 ·
22,9

31.2
33.3

0.4

34.4

1893/941897/98

£~
N~w 1-/orld Total

70.2

Ilc·adl

135.6
11.5 8

Ecuador

18.3

%

Dominican Re?ublic
British ~-lest
Indies
A:;r"ica Total
7.

Ghana
Nir;cria
Car.!eroons
Ivory Coast
Spanish Equatorial

11:98/991902/03
91.2
· 79,0

2.7 3

8.6

19.6

10.5
.17.0
0.113,14 1.3
15
0.2
0.112
0.5
1,14

1918/19- 1923/241922/23
1927/28

19213/291932/33

:!.933/341937/38

1938/391942/43

1943/441947/48

1948/491952/53

210.0

252.l
33,2

193. 9
34.1

237.3
33.4

228.6
33,3

68.9

82.8

124.5

23-.9

14.4

17.9

130.5
13.8 .

22.2
17 .3

22.5
32.3

21.0
31. 7

24.3
21,8

120.4

223.1

30li, 9

364•. 7

39. 1

52.7

60.9

64.2

73.6

155.8

216.1

1·

302.9

300,l:
7.,).J.

129.8

37.0
160.0

1411. (,

23.6

30.7

3(,.:;

27.6

30.0
13.2

33.7
13,1

3~. ~;

9.4

448.9

393,5

499,9

50l.6

71, 7. 1

65.4

64.5

65,8

61.5

266.0

250,9

210, l

253,3

6'.), '·'
366,7

34.4
109,4
15. 7

24.2
12.6

463.6
65.3

236,7

...

1953/54- 1958/.'.:
1957/58 1962/(i:-:

0.8

3,4.

9,9

25. 7

42.0

59,0

91,0

108.5

90.0

105.4

234.?
100.0

1.6

4.1

3.5

. 5. 9

12.5

24.9

2t.-.o

35.l

52.3

62.8

12.7

6C.?.
71. ')

0.2

3-.1
1.9

8,8

24.1

47.2

37,li

27.2

53.8

61.8

0,616

1.1

2.0

3.6

4.3

5.0

7.1

10.7

11. 7

14.1

15.4

15. 7

2016

7CJJ
25. 9

7.81

16.5

24,1

34,6

27.6

27.5

17.4

12.8

10.0

6.4

9,6

8.0

8,0

n n
,.,.,,

10,
3.21,4,7

4.6

5.5

7.. 3

7.0

7.3

8,6

9.3

9.0

20. "/

3.5

3.1

2.3

1.7

1.7

l. 7

1.3

6,6
1,1

12.0

4.0

8.5
1,3

7.9

3,9

1.0

1.5

2.0

82.0

115.0

163.0

240.0

308.0

423.0

501.0

560.0

710,0

_686.0

610.0

760.0

81&.o

1063,7.

--

hce;ion

S.:io. Thome &
Principe
Other
%

Horld Total

✓-.-,,:'.

'"i

//

PERCENTAGES OF PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES
Five Year Averages

/

.L. ..~..:1::Y.

1893/94- · 1898/99- 1903/041902/03 1'107/08
1897/98

1908/091912/13

1913/141917/18

1918/191922/23

1923/241927/28

1923/291932/33

1933/341937/38

1938/391942/43

1943/441947/48

1948/491952/33

1953/54-· 1953/'.i) ·
1957/58 .12.§U:·~~

85.6

79.0

73.6

63.1

58.6

45.6

37,4

34,1

33.4

33.3

34.4

33.2

37.0

28. J

Brazil

10.4

16.1

15.5

13.2

14. 7

13.3

13.8

14.6

17.5

19.0

17.9

17.1 ·

19,6

13.5

Ecuador

22.3

20.3

15.2

15.5

13.9 .

a.9

4.8

2.5

2.5

2.0

2,6

3.1

3.8

3.1;

3.3

.'J. 7

8,5

7.6

6.8

5.2.

4.5

3.7

3,4

3,5

4.5

3.9

4.1

. 3.11

21.5

15.2

17,2

13.4

4.0

4.1

6.4

5.6

3.1

1,8

1,5

1. 7

1,6

I. 2

10.5

17.0

22.9

33.8

39.1

52.7

60,9

64.2

65.3

65.4

611.5

65.8

61.5

69. 'J

0.1

1.1

5.2

14.3

23. 7

36.8

43.1

41,7

37,6

36.6

34.4

33.3

20.7

31:. ·;

0.2

0.5

1.4

3,2

6.1

8.4

10.4

12,8

15,8

14.8

13.9

12,2

15. 7

o.4

1.0

1.7

1.1

0.7

1.2

2.2

3,5

3.5

5.8

6,9

7.7

G.7

. .,.

0,1

0,4

1.8

4.2

6,6

5,5 .

4.5

7.1

7,5

7.3

Ne 1-: 1-!orld Total

Dominican Republic
British t·Jest
Indies
Africa
Ghana
Nigeria
Cameroons

O, l

Ivory Coast
Spanish Equatorial
Region

0.7

1.0

1,2

1.5

1,4

1,1

1.4

1,9

1,6

2.1

2.6

2.1

2,5

2.1:

Saow Thome &

9.5·

14.3

14.8

14,4

9,0

6,5

3,5

2,3

1,5

0,9

1,6

1,1

1.0

0 -~

3.9

4.0

3.5

3.1

2,3

1.7

1,7

1,7

1,3

1.3

1,1

1,0

1,5

~. · ~

Pr::.ncipe
Other

\

